Mathematical Epistemology and Psychology (1974) (Synthese Library #12)
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- Synopsis
- One of the controversial philosophical issues of recent years has been the question of the nature of logical and mathematical entities. Platonist or linguistic modes of explanation have become fashionable, whilst abstracĀ tionist and constructionist theories have ceased to be so. Beth and Piaget approach this problem in their book from two somewhat different points of view. Beth's approach is largely historico-critical, although he discusses the nature of heuristic thinking in mathematics, whilst that of Piaget is psycho-genetic. The major purpose of this introduction is to summarise some of the main points of their respective arguments. In the first part of this book Beth makes a detailed study of the history of philosophical thinking about mathematics, and draws our attention to the important role played by the Aristotelian methodology of the demonĀ strative sciences. This, he tells us, is characterised by three postulates: (a) deductivity, (b) self-evidence, and (c) reality. The last postulate asserts that the primitive notions of a demonstrative science must have reference to a domain of real entities in order to have significance. On the AristoteĀ lian view discursive reasoning plays a major role in mathematics, whilst pure intuition plays a somewhat subordinate one.
- Copyright:
- 1974
Book Details
- Book Quality:
- Publisher Quality
- ISBN-13:
- 9789401721936
- Related ISBNs:
- 9789027700711
- Publisher:
- Springer Netherlands
- Date of Addition:
- 08/09/22
- Copyrighted By:
- Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
- Adult content:
- No
- Language:
- English
- Has Image Descriptions:
- No
- Categories:
- History, Nonfiction, Language Arts
- Submitted By:
- Bookshare Staff
- Usage Restrictions:
- This is a copyrighted book.
- Translator:
- W. Mays