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Moral Phenomena
by Nicolai HartmannSince the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism. Only a few philosophers have been able to escape from this Procrustean bed. Foremost among these few is Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Together with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, Hartmann was instrumental in restoring metaphysics. Hartmann's metaphysics differs markedly from that of both Bergson and Heidegger, in his indebtedness to Plato.In 1926, Hartmann published a massive treatise, Ethik, which was translated into English by Stanton Coit and published as Ethics in 1932. Ethics is probably the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The central concept of the book is ""value."" Drawing upon the pre-modern view of ethics, Hartmann maintains that values are objectively given, part and parcel of the order of being. We cannot invent values, we can merely discover them.The first part of Ethics is concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena and criticizes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. After some introductory thoughts concerning the competence of practical philosophy, Hartmann discusses the essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of the ""ought."" Hartmann is both controversial and compelling. He provides a moral philosophy that rejects the subjectivism of the ruling approaches, without taking recourse to older theological notions on the foundation of the ethical. In sum: Hartmann's Ethics constitutes an impressive and preeminent contribution to moral philosophy.
Moral Phenomena
by Nicolai HartmannSince the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism. Only a few philosophers have been able to escape from this Procrustean bed. Foremost among these few is Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Together with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, Hartmann was instrumental in restoring metaphysics. Hartmann's metaphysics differs markedly from that of both Bergson and Heidegger, in his indebtedness to Plato.In 1926, Hartmann published a massive treatise, Ethik, which was translated into English by Stanton Coit and published as Ethics in 1932. Ethics is probably the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The central concept of the book is ""value."" Drawing upon the pre-modern view of ethics, Hartmann maintains that values are objectively given, part and parcel of the order of being. We cannot invent values, we can merely discover them.The first part of Ethics is concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena and criticizes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. After some introductory thoughts concerning the competence of practical philosophy, Hartmann discusses the essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of the ""ought."" Hartmann is both controversial and compelling. He provides a moral philosophy that rejects the subjectivism of the ruling approaches, without taking recourse to older theological notions on the foundation of the ethical. In sum: Hartmann's Ethics constitutes an impressive and preeminent contribution to moral philosophy.
Moral Philosophers and the Novel: A Study of Winch, Nussbaum and Rorty
by P. JohnsonIn this fascinating study, Peter Johnson makes explicit the issues involved in using the novel as a source in moral philosophy. The book pays close attention to questions of method, aesthetic accounts of the novel and the nature of ethical knowledge. The views of leading philosophers are examined and criticised in the light of the book's distinctive contribution to the current debate.
Moral Philosophy and Moral Life
by Anne-Marie Søndergaard ChristensenMoral Philosophy and Moral Life addresses the questions of the role of moral philosophy and its relationship to our ordinary moral lives. Christensen's argument is motivated by the belief that one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today is the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops. The first part untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenge the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theories as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life; both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, her commitments, and her moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community, and her language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. While the scope of the argument is wide, the aims are more moderate: to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy aimed at spurring debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.
Moral Philosophy and Moral Life
by Anne-Marie Søndergaard ChristensenMoral Philosophy and Moral Life addresses the questions of the role of moral philosophy and its relationship to our ordinary moral lives. Christensen's argument is motivated by the belief that one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today is the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops. The first part untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenge the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theories as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life; both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, her commitments, and her moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community, and her language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. While the scope of the argument is wide, the aims are more moderate: to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy aimed at spurring debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.
The Moral Philosophy of David Hume
by R.David BroilesThis work is primarily concerned with Hume's arguments concerning the respective roles of reason and passion in moral decisions. Thus, the major part of the work deals with section I of Part I of Book III of the Treatise, where Hume argues that moral distinctions are not derived from reason. But in discussing this section, I have had to take into account most ofthe other sections of Book III, and some important ones from Book II of the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Omissions, however, are noticeable. While I have gone into great detail on Parts I and II ofthe Treatise of Morals, I have omitted any discussion of Part III. I have not discussed everything Hume has to say on ethics, or even everything in Book III of the Treatise. I have placed certain limits on myself in writing this work. I attempt to point out only what is central to Hume's ethics, and this I believe to be the first section of Book III, and to show how certain assumptions and conclusions of this section underlie the rest of Hume's considerations on ethics. Thus, I have tried to show that Hume's discussion of the artificial virtues necessarily follows from the assump tions and conclusions of section I. But I leave it to the reader, in his further study of Hume, to apply my points to other sections of Hume that I have not discussed.
The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley (International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées #33)
by Paul J. OlscampUpon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to our selves. That we have 1 first raised a dust, and then complain, we cannot see. . . . there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will 2 appear not to follow from them. In an effort to comply with these excellent principles of Berkeley's, I have tried to avoid complex language throughout this book, and to give all of his works the careful scrutiny he urges in order to avoid misplaced emphasis and quoting out of context. George Berkeley waS born in Dysert Castle, Thomastown, Kilkenny, Ireland, in 1685. He is among the best known of Western philosophers, but a brief sketch of the high points of his life might nonetheless be of some interest. His father William Berkeley was related to Lord Berkeley of Stratton, who was the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from 1670 to 1672. His mother was probably related to General Wolfe, the conqueror of Montcalm in Canada. He was educated at Kilkenny School, and at Trinity College, Dublin, where he received Bachelor's and Master's degrees in 1704 and 1707 respectively.
The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori: Agency and Ethical Life
by Patrick FriersonIn the first scholarly exposition of Maria Montessori's moral philosophy, Patrick R. Frierson presents an empirically-grounded ethics that takes its start from our tendency to strive for excellence and emphasizes mutual respect, social solidarity, and love. Laying out a compelling, Montessorian approach to ethical life, Frierson constructs an account of human agency based on children, who when attentively at work on self-chosen tasks, have agency worthy of respect. Through this interpretation of children's agency, he introduces the core concept of Montessorian “character”: in Montessori's ethics, character provides the ultimate value worthy of direct respect, and those with character have a natural tendency to respect others. Character is enhanced through corporate forms of agency that Montessori calls “social solidarity.” Weaving this educationalist's ethics with theory from Nietzsche, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, Frierson places Montessori in the context of the history of philosophy. His study effectively unites philosophy and education, showing how human ethical life can be enhanced through a moral theory based on the respectful attention to the lived agency of young children.
The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori: Agency and Ethical Life
by Patrick FriersonIn the first scholarly exposition of Maria Montessori's moral philosophy, Patrick R. Frierson presents an empirically-grounded ethics that takes its start from our tendency to strive for excellence and emphasizes mutual respect, social solidarity, and love. Laying out a compelling, Montessorian approach to ethical life, Frierson constructs an account of human agency based on children, who when attentively at work on self-chosen tasks, have agency worthy of respect. Through this interpretation of children's agency, he introduces the core concept of Montessorian “character”: in Montessori's ethics, character provides the ultimate value worthy of direct respect, and those with character have a natural tendency to respect others. Character is enhanced through corporate forms of agency that Montessori calls “social solidarity.” Weaving this educationalist's ethics with theory from Nietzsche, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, Frierson places Montessori in the context of the history of philosophy. His study effectively unites philosophy and education, showing how human ethical life can be enhanced through a moral theory based on the respectful attention to the lived agency of young children.
Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity (The New Synthese Historical Library #57)
by Jill Kraye Risto SaarinenOver the past twenty years the transition from the late Middle Ages to the early modern era has received increasing attention from experts in the history of philosophy. In part, this new interest arises from claims, made in literature aimed at a less specialist readership, that this transition was responsible for the subsequent philosophical and theological problems of the Enlightenment. Philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre and theologians like John Milbank display a certain nostalgia for the medieval synthesis of Thomas Aquinas and, consequently, evaluate the period from 1300 to 1700 in rather negative terms. Other historians of philosophy writing for the general public, such as Charles Taylor, take a more positive view of the Reformation but nevertheless conclude that modernity has been shaped by 1 conflicts which stem from early modern times. Ethics and moral thought occupy a central place in these theories. It is assumed that we have lost something – the concept of virtue, for instance, or the source of common morality. Yet those who put forward such notions do not treat the history of ethics in detail. From the historian’s perspective, their far-reaching theoretical assumptions are based on a quite small body of textual evidence. In reality, there was a rich variety of approaches to moral thinking and ethical theories during the period from 1400 to 1600.
Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality (Law and Philosophy Library #9)
by Wojciech Sadurskilt is a commonplace that law and morality intersect and interpenetrate in all the areas of legal decision-making; that in order to make sense of constitutional, statutory or common-law questions, judges and other legal decision-makers must first resolve certain philosophical issues which include moral judgments of right and wrang_ This is particularly evident with regard to constitutional interpretation, especially when constitutions give a mandate for the protection of the substantive norms and values entrenched as constitutional rights. In these Situations, as a leading contemporary legal philosopher observed, the "Constitution fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity of a law depend on an answer to complex moral 1 problems". But the need for substantive value elucidation is not confined, of course, only to constitutional interpretation under Bills of Rights. This, however, immediately raises a dilemma stemming from the moral diversity and pluralism of modern liberal societies. How can law remain sensitive to this pluralism and yet provide clear answers to the problems which call for a legal resolution? Sharply conflicting values in modern societies clash in the debates over the death penalty, abortion, homosexuality, separation of state and religion, the scope of the freedom of the press, or affirmative action. lt would often be difficult to discern a broader consensus within which these clashes of values operate, unless this consensus were described in such vague terms as to render it practically meaningless.
Moral Pluralism and the Complexity of Punishment: The Penal Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (Routledge Research in Legal Philosophy)
by Nicolas NayfeldThis book advances a new interpretation of Hart’s penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal/constraint approach. Rather, it is argued, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This original interpretation is not based only on Hart’s key volume on the subject Punishment and Responsibility, but on a careful reading of his complete works. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers interested in Hart’s philosophy, the philosophy of law and criminal law.
Moral Pluralism and the Complexity of Punishment: The Penal Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (Routledge Research in Legal Philosophy)
by Nicolas NayfeldThis book advances a new interpretation of Hart’s penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal/constraint approach. Rather, it is argued, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This original interpretation is not based only on Hart’s key volume on the subject Punishment and Responsibility, but on a careful reading of his complete works. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers interested in Hart’s philosophy, the philosophy of law and criminal law.
The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature
by P. M. HackerA milestone in the study of value in human life and thought, written by one of the world’s preeminent living philosophers The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature is a philosophical investigation of the moral potentialities and sensibilities of human beings, of the meaning of human life, and of the place of death in life. It is an essay in philosophical anthropology: the study of the conceptual framework in terms of which we think about, speak about, and investigate homo sapiens as a social and cultural animal. This volume examines the diversity of values in human life and the place of moral value within the varieties of values. Its subject is the nature of good and evil and our propensity to virtue and vice. Acting as the culmination of five decades of reflection on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, and human nature, this volume: Concludes Hacker’s acclaimed Human Nature tetralogy: Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature, and The Passions: A Study of Human Nature Discusses traditional ideas about ethical value and addresses misconceptions held by philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature is required reading philosophers of mind, ethicists, psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and any general reader wanting to understand the nature of value and the place of ethics in human lives.
The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature
by P. M. HackerA milestone in the study of value in human life and thought, written by one of the world’s preeminent living philosophers The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature is a philosophical investigation of the moral potentialities and sensibilities of human beings, of the meaning of human life, and of the place of death in life. It is an essay in philosophical anthropology: the study of the conceptual framework in terms of which we think about, speak about, and investigate homo sapiens as a social and cultural animal. This volume examines the diversity of values in human life and the place of moral value within the varieties of values. Its subject is the nature of good and evil and our propensity to virtue and vice. Acting as the culmination of five decades of reflection on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, and human nature, this volume: Concludes Hacker’s acclaimed Human Nature tetralogy: Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature, and The Passions: A Study of Human Nature Discusses traditional ideas about ethical value and addresses misconceptions held by philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature is required reading philosophers of mind, ethicists, psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and any general reader wanting to understand the nature of value and the place of ethics in human lives.
Moral Powers, Fragile Beliefs: Essays in Moral and Religious Philosophy
by James Carter Daniel Whistler Joseph CarlisleInternationally renowned philosophers and up-and-coming researchers explore the intersection of philosophy of religion and moral philosophy.
Moral Practices Vol 6
by D.Z. Phillips H.O. MounceThis is Volume VI of nine in a collection of studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. Originally published in 1970, this volume looks at moral practices and the question which has puzzled philosophers: whether any value judgement can follow logically from the facts, can follow in such a way that someone who assents to the facts is bound in logic to assent also to the value judgement based upon them.
Moral Practices Vol 6
by D.Z. Phillips H.O. MounceThis is Volume VI of nine in a collection of studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. Originally published in 1970, this volume looks at moral practices and the question which has puzzled philosophers: whether any value judgement can follow logically from the facts, can follow in such a way that someone who assents to the facts is bound in logic to assent also to the value judgement based upon them.
Moral Principles (Bloomsbury Ethics)
by Maike AlbertzartThe history of moral philosophy has been dominated by attempts to find and defend the correct moral principle or set of principles. However, over the last two decades the assumption that morality can and should be understood in terms of principles has come under attack from several quarters. The most radical attack has come from so-called moral particularists according to whom principles are at best useless and at worst a hindrance to successful moral reasoning and action.Why should – and how can – morality be based on principles? These are the leading questions of this book. Moral Principles offers a historically informed, in-depth examination of the current particularist/generalist debate and presents a novel account of the place of principles in our moral thought and action.
Moral Principles (Bloomsbury Ethics)
by Maike AlbertzartThe history of moral philosophy has been dominated by attempts to find and defend the correct moral principle or set of principles. However, over the last two decades the assumption that morality can and should be understood in terms of principles has come under attack from several quarters. The most radical attack has come from so-called moral particularists according to whom principles are at best useless and at worst a hindrance to successful moral reasoning and action.Why should – and how can – morality be based on principles? These are the leading questions of this book. Moral Principles offers a historically informed, in-depth examination of the current particularist/generalist debate and presents a novel account of the place of principles in our moral thought and action.
Moral Progress (Munich Lectures in Ethics)
by Philip KitcherThis inaugural volume in the Munich Lectures in Ethics series presents lectures by noted philosopher Philip Kitcher. In these lectures, Kitcher develops further the pragmatist approach to moral philosophy, begun in his book The Ethical Project. He uses three historical examples of moral progress--the abolition of chattel slavery, the expansion of opportunities for women, and the increasing acceptance of same-sex love--to propose methods for moral inquiry. In his recommended methodology, Kitcher sees moral progress, for individuals and for societies, through collective discussions that become more inclusive, better informed, and involve participants more inclined to engage with the perspectives of others and aim at actions tolerable by all. The volume is introduced by Jan-Christoph Heilinger and contains commentaries from distinguished scholars Amia Srinivasan, Susan Neiman, and Rahel Jaeggi, and Kitcher's response to their commentaries.
Moral Progress (Munich Lectures in Ethics)
by Philip KitcherThis inaugural volume in the Munich Lectures in Ethics series presents lectures by noted philosopher Philip Kitcher. In these lectures, Kitcher develops further the pragmatist approach to moral philosophy, begun in his book The Ethical Project. He uses three historical examples of moral progress--the abolition of chattel slavery, the expansion of opportunities for women, and the increasing acceptance of same-sex love--to propose methods for moral inquiry. In his recommended methodology, Kitcher sees moral progress, for individuals and for societies, through collective discussions that become more inclusive, better informed, and involve participants more inclined to engage with the perspectives of others and aim at actions tolerable by all. The volume is introduced by Jan-Christoph Heilinger and contains commentaries from distinguished scholars Amia Srinivasan, Susan Neiman, and Rahel Jaeggi, and Kitcher's response to their commentaries.
Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction
by Valerie TiberiusThis is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosophical inquiry.
Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction
by Valerie TiberiusThis is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosophical inquiry.