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Constitutional Law, Religion and Equal Liberty: The Impact of Desecularization (Routledge Research in Constitutional Law)
by Azin TadjdiniDuring the 20th century many countries embarked on a process of constitutional secularization by which the role of religion gradually became limited. Yet, by the late 20th century, and increasingly following the end of the Cold War, this development began to be challenged. This book examines the return of religion in constitutions through the concept of constitutional de-secularization. It places this phenomenon in the context of the constitutional memory of the countries in which it has taken place and critically examines it against the development and standards of constitutionalism, as the prevailing constitutional legal and political theory. Central to this analysis is the impact of constitutional de-secularization on the regulation of equality in liberty, that is, both the regulation of constitutional rights and the scope for equality of those who are granted such rights. The book argues that equal liberty forms an essential part of constitutionalism as a theory, and that constitutionalism therefore entails a continuous development towards expanding it. The first and second part of the book presents a conceptual framework for the study of constitutional de-secularization. The third part presents and analyses three cases of constitutional de-secularization in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. The book will be of interest to researchers and policy-makers interested in constitutional history and theory, and the role of religion in law and its compatibility with human rights.
The Constitutional Legitimacy of Law Officers in the United Kingdom
by Conor McCormickThis book provides a detailed account of each law officer's functions and draws on that account as the basis for a conceptual analysis of their constitutional legitimacy.In recent years, the constitutional legitimacy of law officers has been questioned repeatedly because of recurring controversies surrounding the discharge of their varied functions. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that those functions enable law officers to play a highly influential part in the regulation and exercise of public power throughout the United Kingdom. McCormick argues that the most persuasive framework for analysing the offices which make up this diverse regime involves concentrating on the constitutional values of independence, accountability and trust which underpin it.Both aspects of the book – namely the explanation of individual functions and the conceptual analysis of collective legitimacy – are written in a holistic way which encompasses critical analyses about the Attorney General and Solicitor General for England and Wales; the Counsel General for Wales; the Lord Advocate, Solicitor General and Advocate General for Scotland, as well as the Attorney General and Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
The Constitutional Legitimacy of Law Officers in the United Kingdom
by Conor McCormickThis book provides a detailed account of each law officer's functions and draws on that account as the basis for a conceptual analysis of their constitutional legitimacy.In recent years, the constitutional legitimacy of law officers has been questioned repeatedly because of recurring controversies surrounding the discharge of their varied functions. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that those functions enable law officers to play a highly influential part in the regulation and exercise of public power throughout the United Kingdom. McCormick argues that the most persuasive framework for analysing the offices which make up this diverse regime involves concentrating on the constitutional values of independence, accountability and trust which underpin it.Both aspects of the book – namely the explanation of individual functions and the conceptual analysis of collective legitimacy – are written in a holistic way which encompasses critical analyses about the Attorney General and Solicitor General for England and Wales; the Counsel General for Wales; the Lord Advocate, Solicitor General and Advocate General for Scotland, as well as the Attorney General and Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
Constitutional Life and Europe's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Applied Legal Philosophy)
by Alun Howard GibbsThe challenge of thinking about the place of constitutionalism beyond the conventional categories of the nation state has become a principal concern for legal and political scholars. This book casts this issue in a different light by exploring the implications for the constitutionalism of legal integration in the European Union's 'area of freedom, security and justice'. In doing so it makes a novel contribution to an understanding of the European Union as a political community beyond the state, but in addition explores how this entails thinking differently about what is essential concerning constitutionalism. The book argues that instead of seeking to theorise constitutional foundations we actually begin to encounter the constitutional life implied by political and legal practices in the European Union and as exemplified here by 'the area of freedom, security and justice'.
Constitutional Life and Europe's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Applied Legal Philosophy)
by Alun Howard GibbsThe challenge of thinking about the place of constitutionalism beyond the conventional categories of the nation state has become a principal concern for legal and political scholars. This book casts this issue in a different light by exploring the implications for the constitutionalism of legal integration in the European Union's 'area of freedom, security and justice'. In doing so it makes a novel contribution to an understanding of the European Union as a political community beyond the state, but in addition explores how this entails thinking differently about what is essential concerning constitutionalism. The book argues that instead of seeking to theorise constitutional foundations we actually begin to encounter the constitutional life implied by political and legal practices in the European Union and as exemplified here by 'the area of freedom, security and justice'.
Constitutional Limits and the Public Sphere: A Critical Study of Bentham's Constitutionalism
by Oren Ben-DorThe place of utility as a critical theory of human existence has been largely discredited and its potential undermined in the course of modern debates in ethical,political and legal theory. The central intuition that guides the argument of this book is that both the technical and reductionist methodology associated with utilitarianism do not do justice to the theory which identifies the maximisation of pleasure as the most fundamental self-interest of man.Enlarging upon this intuition, the book is mainly concerned with critical constitutionalism. Based on a close reading of Bentham's unpublished and recently published texts, the argument in the first part shows that a critical analysis of constitutionally limited government formed a central theme of Bentham's utilitarian enterprise. The theme of the author's reconstruction is that, for Bentham, constitutional limits signified socially dynamic relationships within the public sphere and between this sphere and a centralised coercive authority. Because this relationship is socially dynamic, the ever-changing communal-based conception of harm constantly transforms the relationship between law and the community which it governs. This feature reappears in many layers of Bentham's thought, such as his theory of sovereignty, the duty to obey the law, and the motivational basis for forming and transforming a conception of harm within the public sphere. Even the most revisionist of Bentham scholars fail to capture this central unifying theme in Bentham's writings.The second part of the book further develops this reconstruction. It argues that an underdeveloped insight of critical importance characterised Bentham's utilitarianism. This insight helps to elucidate the transient and dynamic connection of ethics to politics. In critically reviewing five contemporary accounts of this connection, utility is shown to have closer affinities with communitarianism. However as a critical theory, utility has more in common with the Habermasian notion of communication and inter-subjectivity than with Humean conventionalism. The utilitarian critic is in a position to transcend not only the simple hedonism with which utilitarianism has always been associated, but also the historically-ridden perspectives which potentially dogmatise the range of human possibilities under a received conception of harm.
Constitutional Limits on Coercive Interrogation
by Amos N. GuioraOn September 11, 2001 terrorism instantly became the defining issue of our age. The resulting debates surrounding the inherent tension between national security interests and individual civil rights has focused national and international attention on how post-9/11 detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and around the world have been interrogated. All concerned agree that, while interrogation practices represent a crucial meeting ground between human rights and counter-terrorism measures, the limits placed on interrogators are perhaps the most difficult to define for they determine how "far" a civil society is willing to go in fighting the exigencies that terror presents. In The Constitutional Limits of Coercive Investigation, Amos Guiora offers a theoretical analysis and a practical application of coercive interrogation, and in doing so, suggests developing and implementing a hybrid paradigm based on American criminal law, the Geneva Convention, and the Israeli model of trial as the most relevant judicial regime. Guiora offers a unique contribution to the public debate by creatively utilizing a historical analysis of the system of "justice" for African-Americans in the Deep South of the past century to serve as a guide for the constitutional rights and protections which need to be granted or extended to an unprotected class. He then indicates which interrogation methods are within the boundaries of the law by both recommending protection of the detainees and providing interrogators with the tools required to protect America's vital interests.
Constitutional Limits on Coercive Interrogation
by Amos N. GuioraOn September 11, 2001 terrorism instantly became the defining issue of our age. The resulting debates surrounding the inherent tension between national security interests and individual civil rights has focused national and international attention on how post-9/11 detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and around the world have been interrogated. All concerned agree that, while interrogation practices represent a crucial meeting ground between human rights and counter-terrorism measures, the limits placed on interrogators are perhaps the most difficult to define for they determine how "far" a civil society is willing to go in fighting the exigencies that terror presents. In The Constitutional Limits of Coercive Investigation, Amos Guiora offers a theoretical analysis and a practical application of coercive interrogation, and in doing so, suggests developing and implementing a hybrid paradigm based on American criminal law, the Geneva Convention, and the Israeli model of trial as the most relevant judicial regime. Guiora offers a unique contribution to the public debate by creatively utilizing a historical analysis of the system of "justice" for African-Americans in the Deep South of the past century to serve as a guide for the constitutional rights and protections which need to be granted or extended to an unprotected class. He then indicates which interrogation methods are within the boundaries of the law by both recommending protection of the detainees and providing interrogators with the tools required to protect America's vital interests.
Constitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law
by Bruce P. FrohnenAmericans are ruled by an unwritten constitution consisting of executive orders, signing statements, and other quasi-laws designed to reform society, Bruce Frohnen and George Carey argue. Consequently, the Constitution no longer means what it says to the people it is supposed to govern and the government no longer acts according to the rule of law.
Constitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law
by Bruce P. FrohnenAmericans are ruled by an unwritten constitution consisting of executive orders, signing statements, and other quasi-laws designed to reform society, Bruce Frohnen and George Carey argue. Consequently, the Constitution no longer means what it says to the people it is supposed to govern and the government no longer acts according to the rule of law.
Constitutional Mythologies: New Perspectives on Controlling the State (Studies in Public Choice #23)
by Alain MarcianoOur societies obviously rest on common beliefs. These "myths" are tools that help us to develop and build common identities; they form the structure around which societies function. This does not imply that these beliefs are “true,” in the sense that they would be supported by empirical facts. In social matters, myths have undoubtedly important functions to play even if no empirical facts support them. On the other hand, and precisely because they are not discussed, myths may be problematic: they may create illusions, conserve structures that are inefficient and unable to improve the situation of citizens. This is particularly true with constitutions. Constitutions are very important for societies: a constitution is a document — even in societies based on “unwritten” constitutions — which binds citizens together, creating unity among them, and which forms the framework within which our activities take place. As Nobel Prize laureate James Buchanan used to say: constitutions contain the rules of the social game we play in our everyday life. However, constitutions are not frequently debated by citizens. This is why we end up with common beliefs about these constitutions: they are above our heads, around us. We take them, their role, function, and nature as given. The purpose of this volume to investigate and challenge common constitutional myths. Featuring contributions from prominent economists, political scientists, and legal scholars, the chapters in this volume address such myths as “constitutions are binding social contracts,” “constitutions are economic documents” and “constitutions are legal documents.” Illustrating their analyses with historical and contemporary examples from the United States, Canada, and Europe, the authors build a multi-layered approach to understanding constitutions and their implications for social and political influence.
A Constitutional Order of States?: Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood
by Anthony Arnull Catherine Barnard Michael Dougan Eleanor SpaventaThis collection celebrates the career of Professor Alan Dashwood, a leading member of the generation of British academics who organised, explained and analysed what we now call European Union law for the benefit of lawyers trained in the common law tradition. It takes as its starting point Professor Dashwood's vivid description of the European Union as a 'constitutional order of states'. He intended that phrase to capture the unique character of the Union. On the one hand, it is a supranational order characterised by its own distinctive institutional dynamics and an unprecedented level of cohesion among, and penetration into, the national legal systems. On the other hand, it remains an organisation of derived powers, the Member States retaining their character as sovereign entities under international law. This theme permeates both the constitutional and the substantive law of the Union. Contributors to the collection include members of the judiciary and distinguished practitioners, officials and academics. They consider the foundations, strengths, implications and shortcomings of this conceptual framework in various fields of EU law and policy. The collection is an essential purchase for anyone interested in the constitutional framework of the contemporary European Union.
A Constitutional Order of States?: Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood
by Anthony Arnull Catherine Barnard Michael Dougan Eleanor SpaventaThis collection celebrates the career of Professor Alan Dashwood, a leading member of the generation of British academics who organised, explained and analysed what we now call European Union law for the benefit of lawyers trained in the common law tradition. It takes as its starting point Professor Dashwood's vivid description of the European Union as a 'constitutional order of states'. He intended that phrase to capture the unique character of the Union. On the one hand, it is a supranational order characterised by its own distinctive institutional dynamics and an unprecedented level of cohesion among, and penetration into, the national legal systems. On the other hand, it remains an organisation of derived powers, the Member States retaining their character as sovereign entities under international law. This theme permeates both the constitutional and the substantive law of the Union. Contributors to the collection include members of the judiciary and distinguished practitioners, officials and academics. They consider the foundations, strengths, implications and shortcomings of this conceptual framework in various fields of EU law and policy. The collection is an essential purchase for anyone interested in the constitutional framework of the contemporary European Union.
Constitutional Origin and Norm Creation in Colombia: Discursive Institutionalism and the Empowerment of the Constitutional Court (Comparative Constitutional Change)
by Jan BoestenThis book explains the growing empowerment of the Colombian Constitutional Court in the early years of the 21st century and develops the concept of the deliberative judge. Taking the case of the Colombian Constitutional Court and drawing on neoinstitutional theory to explain the relationship between political crisis and institutional reforms, the book challenges the notion of rational choice institutionalism that agents act strategically. It indicates the limits of path dependence and argues instead that discursive institutionalism is the most appropriate method for analyzing processes of institutional learning. Combining theoretical and empirical research, it builds the argument that judicial independence promotes the case for deliberative democracy over rational choice or strategic action approaches. Finally, the book suggests that by introducing communicative and cognitive variables in our understanding of key actors and processes, we are more capable of bridging institutional origin and legacy. The work will be a valuable resource for academics, researchers, and policy-makers in Constitutional Law, Constitutional Politics, and Constitutional History.
Constitutional Origin and Norm Creation in Colombia: Discursive Institutionalism and the Empowerment of the Constitutional Court (Comparative Constitutional Change)
by Jan BoestenThis book explains the growing empowerment of the Colombian Constitutional Court in the early years of the 21st century and develops the concept of the deliberative judge. Taking the case of the Colombian Constitutional Court and drawing on neoinstitutional theory to explain the relationship between political crisis and institutional reforms, the book challenges the notion of rational choice institutionalism that agents act strategically. It indicates the limits of path dependence and argues instead that discursive institutionalism is the most appropriate method for analyzing processes of institutional learning. Combining theoretical and empirical research, it builds the argument that judicial independence promotes the case for deliberative democracy over rational choice or strategic action approaches. Finally, the book suggests that by introducing communicative and cognitive variables in our understanding of key actors and processes, we are more capable of bridging institutional origin and legacy. The work will be a valuable resource for academics, researchers, and policy-makers in Constitutional Law, Constitutional Politics, and Constitutional History.
Constitutional Originalism: A Debate
by Robert W. Bennett Lawrence B. SolumProblems of constitutional interpretation have many faces, but much of the contemporary discussion has focused on what has come to be called "originalism." The core of originalism is the belief that fidelity to the original understanding of the Constitution should constrain contemporary judges. As originalist thinking has evolved, it has become clear that there is a family of originalist theories, some emphasizing the intent of the framers, while others focus on the original public meaning of the constitutional text. This idea has enjoyed a modern resurgence, in good part in reaction to the assumption of more sweeping power by the judiciary, operating in the name of constitutional interpretation. Those arguing for a "living Constitution" that keeps up with a changing world and changing values have resisted originalism. This difference in legal philosophy and jurisprudence has, since the 1970s, spilled over into party politics and the partisan wrangling over court appointments from appellate courts to the Supreme Court.In Constitutional Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B. Solum elucidate the two sides of this debate and mediate between them in order to separate differences that are real from those that are only apparent. In a thorough exploration of the range of contemporary views on originalism, the authors articulate and defend sharply contrasting positions. Solum brings learning from the philosophy of language to his argument in favor of originalism, and Bennett highlights interpretational problems in the dispute-resolution context, describing instances in which a living Constitution is a more feasible and productive position. The book explores those contrasting positions, to be sure, but also uncovers important points of agreement for the interpretational enterprise. This provocative and absorbing book ends with a bibliographic essay that points to landmark works in the field and helps lay readers and students orient themselves within the literature of the debate.
Constitutional Orphan: Gender Equality and the Nineteenth Amendment
by Paula A. MonopoliIn Constitutional Orphan, Professor Paula Monopoli explores the significant role of former suffragists in the constitutional development of the Nineteenth Amendment -- the woman suffrage amendment ratified in 1920. She sheds new light on the connection between the suffragists as institutional actors in civil society and the emergence of a "thin" conception of the Nineteenth Amendment as a mere nondiscrimination in voting rule, rather than a robust equality norm. In this compelling legal history, Monopoli illuminates how the Nineteenth had implications for federalism, women's citizenship and the definition of equality, as well as how gender, race and class intersect to affect our constitutional development. Monopoli explores the choice by both the National Woman's Party and the National American Woman Suffrage Association to turn away from African American suffragists who were denied the vote even after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Using original sources, legislative history and case analysis, she develops a persuasive theory connecting that moral and strategic failure to the emergence of a narrow interpretation of the amendment. Monopoli also evaluates the impact of class divisions among former suffragist allies. These divisions around support for the NWP's Equal Rights Amendment, found social feminists opposing that "blanket" amendment for fear of its impact on the constitutional validity of protective labor legislation for working-class women. Monopoli details how many state courts, left without federal enforcement legislation to guide them, used strict construction to cabin the emergence of a more robust interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment, as a broad equality norm. She concludes with an examination of new legal scholarship that suggests ways in which such a robust understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment could be used today to expand gender equality. In this compelling legal history, Monopoli illuminates how gender, race and class intersect to affect our constitutional development.
Constitutional Orphan: Gender Equality and the Nineteenth Amendment
by Paula A. MonopoliIn Constitutional Orphan, Professor Paula Monopoli explores the significant role of former suffragists in the constitutional development of the Nineteenth Amendment -- the woman suffrage amendment ratified in 1920. She sheds new light on the connection between the suffragists as institutional actors in civil society and the emergence of a "thin" conception of the Nineteenth Amendment as a mere nondiscrimination in voting rule, rather than a robust equality norm. In this compelling legal history, Monopoli illuminates how the Nineteenth had implications for federalism, women's citizenship and the definition of equality, as well as how gender, race and class intersect to affect our constitutional development. Monopoli explores the choice by both the National Woman's Party and the National American Woman Suffrage Association to turn away from African American suffragists who were denied the vote even after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Using original sources, legislative history and case analysis, she develops a persuasive theory connecting that moral and strategic failure to the emergence of a narrow interpretation of the amendment. Monopoli also evaluates the impact of class divisions among former suffragist allies. These divisions around support for the NWP's Equal Rights Amendment, found social feminists opposing that "blanket" amendment for fear of its impact on the constitutional validity of protective labor legislation for working-class women. Monopoli details how many state courts, left without federal enforcement legislation to guide them, used strict construction to cabin the emergence of a more robust interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment, as a broad equality norm. She concludes with an examination of new legal scholarship that suggests ways in which such a robust understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment could be used today to expand gender equality. In this compelling legal history, Monopoli illuminates how gender, race and class intersect to affect our constitutional development.
Constitutional Paradigms and the Stability of States
by Noel CoxThis book examines the influence of constitutional legal paradigms upon the political stability and viability of states. It contributes to the literature in the field by focussing on how constitutional flexibility may have led to the rise of 'successful' states and to the decline of 'unsuccessful' states, by promoting stability. Divided into two parts, the book considers theories of the rise and fall of civilizations and individual states, explains the concept of hard and soft constitutions and applies this concept to different types of state models. A series of international case studies in the second part of the book identifies the key dynamics in legal, political and economic history and includes the UK, US, New Zealand and Eastern Europe.
Constitutional Paradigms and the Stability of States
by Noel CoxThis book examines the influence of constitutional legal paradigms upon the political stability and viability of states. It contributes to the literature in the field by focussing on how constitutional flexibility may have led to the rise of 'successful' states and to the decline of 'unsuccessful' states, by promoting stability. Divided into two parts, the book considers theories of the rise and fall of civilizations and individual states, explains the concept of hard and soft constitutions and applies this concept to different types of state models. A series of international case studies in the second part of the book identifies the key dynamics in legal, political and economic history and includes the UK, US, New Zealand and Eastern Europe.
Constitutional Personae: Heroes, Soldiers, Minimalists, and Mutes (Inalienable Rights)
by Cass R. SunsteinSince America's founding, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued a vast number of decisions on a staggeringly wide variety of subjects. And hundreds of judges have occupied the bench. Yet as Cass R. Sunstein, the eminent legal scholar and bestselling co-author of Nudge, points out, almost every one of the Justices fits into a very small number of types regardless of ideology: the hero, the soldier, the minimalist, and the mute. Heroes are willing to invoke the Constitution to invalidate state laws, federal legislation, and prior Court decisions. They loudly embrace first principles and are prone to flair, employing dramatic language to fundamentally reshape the law. Soldiers, on the other hand, are skeptical of judicial power, and typically defer to decisions made by the political branches. Minimalists favor small steps and only incremental change. They worry that bold reversals of long-established traditions may be counterproductive, producing a backlash that only leads to another reversal. Mutes would rather say nothing at all about the big constitutional issues, and instead tend to decide cases on narrow grounds or keep controversial cases out of the Court altogether by denying standing. As Sunstein shows, many of the most important constitutional debates are in fact contests between the four Personae. Whether the issue involves slavery, gender equality, same-sex marriage, executive power, surveillance, or freedom of speech, debates have turned on choices made among the four Personae--choices that derive as much from psychology as constitutional theory. Sunstein himself defends a form of minimalism, arguing that it is the best approach in a self-governing society of free people. More broadly, he casts a genuinely novel light on longstanding disputes over the proper way to interpret the constitution, demonstrating that behind virtually every decision and beneath all of the abstract theory lurk the four Personae. By emphasizing the centrality of character types, Sunstein forces us to rethink everything we know about how the Supreme Court works.
Constitutional Personae: Heroes, Soldiers, Minimalists, and Mutes (Inalienable Rights)
by Cass R. SunsteinSince America's founding, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued a vast number of decisions on a staggeringly wide variety of subjects. And hundreds of judges have occupied the bench. Yet as Cass R. Sunstein, the eminent legal scholar and bestselling co-author of Nudge, points out, almost every one of the Justices fits into a very small number of types regardless of ideology: the hero, the soldier, the minimalist, and the mute. Heroes are willing to invoke the Constitution to invalidate state laws, federal legislation, and prior Court decisions. They loudly embrace first principles and are prone to flair, employing dramatic language to fundamentally reshape the law. Soldiers, on the other hand, are skeptical of judicial power, and typically defer to decisions made by the political branches. Minimalists favor small steps and only incremental change. They worry that bold reversals of long-established traditions may be counterproductive, producing a backlash that only leads to another reversal. Mutes would rather say nothing at all about the big constitutional issues, and instead tend to decide cases on narrow grounds or keep controversial cases out of the Court altogether by denying standing. As Sunstein shows, many of the most important constitutional debates are in fact contests between the four Personae. Whether the issue involves slavery, gender equality, same-sex marriage, executive power, surveillance, or freedom of speech, debates have turned on choices made among the four Personae--choices that derive as much from psychology as constitutional theory. Sunstein himself defends a form of minimalism, arguing that it is the best approach in a self-governing society of free people. More broadly, he casts a genuinely novel light on longstanding disputes over the proper way to interpret the constitution, demonstrating that behind virtually every decision and beneath all of the abstract theory lurk the four Personae. By emphasizing the centrality of character types, Sunstein forces us to rethink everything we know about how the Supreme Court works.
Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (Oxford Studies in European Law)
by Klemen JaklicWhere does the law and political power of any given territory come from? Until recently it was believed that it came from a single and hierarchical source of constitutional authority, a sovereign people and their constitution. However, how can this model account for the new Europe? Where state constitutions and the European Constitution, which are ultimately equally self-standing sources of constitutional authority, overlap heterarchically over a shared piece of territory. Constitutional pluralism is a new branch within constitutional thought that argues sovereignty is no longer the accurate and normatively superior constitutional foundation. It instead replaces this thought with its own foundation. It emerged on the basis of contributions by the leading EU constitutionalists and has now become the most dominant branch of European constitutional thought. Its claims have also overstepped the European context, suggesting that it offers historic advantages for further development of the idea of constitutionalism and world order as such. This book offers the first overarching examination of constitutional pluralism.Comprehensively mapping out the leading contributions to date and solving the complicated labyrinth they currently form, Klemen Jaklic offers a complete assessment against existing and new criticisms while elaborating his own original vision. Constitutional pluralism thus refined has the potential to rightfully be considered the superior new approach within constitutional thought.
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law)
by Matej Avbelj Jan KomárekConstitutional pluralism has become immensely popular among scholars who study European integration and issues of global governance. Some of them believe that constitutionalism, traditionally thought to be bound to a nation state, can emerge beyond state borders - most importantly in the process of European integration, but also beyond that, for example, in international regulatory regimes such as the WTO, or international systems of fundamental rights protection, such as the European Convention. At the same time, the idea of constitutional pluralism has not gone unchallenged. Some have questioned its compatibility with the very nature of law and the values which law brings to constitutionalism. The critiques have come from both sides: from those who believe in the 'traditional' European constitutionalism based on a hierarchically superior authority of the European Union as well as from scholars focusing on constitutions of particular states. The book collects contributions taking opposing perspectives on constitutional pluralism - some defending and promoting the concept of constitutional pluralism, some criticising and opposing it. While some authors can be called 'the founding fathers of constitutional pluralism', others are young academics who have recently entered the field. Together they offer fresh perspectives on both theoretical and practical aspects of constitutional pluralism, enriching our existing understanding of the concept in current scholarship.
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law)
by Matej Avbelj Jan KomárekConstitutional pluralism has become immensely popular among scholars who study European integration and issues of global governance. Some of them believe that constitutionalism, traditionally thought to be bound to a nation state, can emerge beyond state borders - most importantly in the process of European integration, but also beyond that, for example, in international regulatory regimes such as the WTO, or international systems of fundamental rights protection, such as the European Convention. At the same time, the idea of constitutional pluralism has not gone unchallenged. Some have questioned its compatibility with the very nature of law and the values which law brings to constitutionalism. The critiques have come from both sides: from those who believe in the 'traditional' European constitutionalism based on a hierarchically superior authority of the European Union as well as from scholars focusing on constitutions of particular states. The book collects contributions taking opposing perspectives on constitutional pluralism - some defending and promoting the concept of constitutional pluralism, some criticising and opposing it. While some authors can be called 'the founding fathers of constitutional pluralism', others are young academics who have recently entered the field. Together they offer fresh perspectives on both theoretical and practical aspects of constitutional pluralism, enriching our existing understanding of the concept in current scholarship.