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Moral Motivation: A History (Oxford Philosophical Concepts)


Moral Motivation presents a history of the concept of moral motivation. The book consists of ten chapters by eminent scholars in the history of philosophy, covering Plato, Aristotle, later Peripatetic philosophy, medieval philosophy, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte and Hegel, and the consequentialist tradition. In addition, four interdisciplinary "Reflections" discuss how the topic of moral motivation arises in epic poetry, Cicero, early opera, and Theodore Dreiser. Most contemporary philosophical discussions of moral motivation focus on whether and how moral beliefs by themselves motivate an agent (at least to some degree) to act. In much of the history of the concept, especially before Hume, the focus is rather on how to motivate people to act morally as well as on what sort of motivation a person must act from (or what end an agents acts for) in order to be a genuinely ethical person or even to have done a genuinely ethical action. The book shows the complexity of the historical treatment of moral motivation and, moreover, how intertwined moral motivation is with central aspects of ethical theory.

MORAL MOTIVATION A HISTORY OPC C: A History (Oxford Philosophical Concepts)

by Iakovos Vasiliou

Moral Motivation presents a history of the concept of moral motivation. The book consists of ten chapters by eminent scholars in the history of philosophy, covering Plato, Aristotle, later Peripatetic philosophy, medieval philosophy, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte and Hegel, and the consequentialist tradition. In addition, four interdisciplinary "Reflections" discuss how the topic of moral motivation arises in epic poetry, Cicero, early opera, and Theodore Dreiser. Most contemporary philosophical discussions of moral motivation focus on whether and how moral beliefs by themselves motivate an agent (at least to some degree) to act. In much of the history of the concept, especially before Hume, the focus is rather on how to motivate people to act morally as well as on what sort of motivation a person must act from (or what end an agents acts for) in order to be a genuinely ethical person or even to have done a genuinely ethical action. The book shows the complexity of the historical treatment of moral motivation and, moreover, how intertwined moral motivation is with central aspects of ethical theory.

Moral Neuroeducation for a Democratic and Pluralistic Society

by Patrici Calvo Javier Gracia-Calandín

This book brings together a group of top scholars on ethics and moral neuroeducation to cover the specific field of moral learning. Although there are many studies on neural bases of human learning and the application processes in different fields of human activity, such as education, economics or politics, very few of them have delved into the specific field of moral learning. This book brings forward a discursive and cordial ethical concept suitable for the theoretical-practical development of moral neuroeducation, as well as a set of guidelines for the design of an educational model that, based on moral neuroeducation, contributes to the resolution of social problems and the eradication of undesirable patterns and behaviors such as hate speech, corruption, intolerance, nepotism, aporophobia or xenophobia. Furthermore it contains a management approach for the application of this educational model to the different areas of activity involved in social and human development. A must read for students, educators and researchers in the field of moral philosophy, (applied) ethics ethics and any other discipline working with reciprocity (economics, politics, health, etc.).

The Moral Nexus (Carl G. Hempel Lecture Ser. #8)

by R. Jay Wallace

The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.

The Moral Nexus (Carl G. Hempel Lecture Ser. #8)

by R. Jay Wallace

The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.

The Moral Nexus (Carl G. Hempel Lecture Series #15)

by R. Jay Wallace

A new way of understanding the essence of moral obligationThe Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.

Moral Obligations: Action, Intention, and Valuation

by Carol Harding

There are many ways of writing about the moral life; Moral Obligations follows the way of what philosophers call ""meta-ethics"": the analysis, not of particular moral problems, but of how the concepts used in formulating and solving them, concepts like ""right"" and ""obligatory,"" have significance and power over us. The meta-ethical part of this book is preceded by a discussion of action, in which Wren lays the foundations for the argument that moral obligation is a part of the formal structure of human agency.Wren's argument is practical and social-psychological: it is to help all, starting with those who are already committed to some version of the ethic of individual dignity, to promote interagency fellowship and peace as a result of seeing a certain truth, namely, the truth that the urgency of their feelings of moral obligation derives from a unspoken intention to belong to a community of agents.Moral Obligations begins with the philosophy of action, and then it reviews the historical debate about the nature of obligation and its social context. This is followed by a section about action in general: it establishes the standpoint of the agent and makes an inventory of several species of action. Later chapters summarize the foregoing themes, with emphasis on the unspoken side of intention, and develop them in conjunction with an analysis of the hypothetical imperative. The work closes with a discussion of the dilemma of membership in competing moral communities.

Moral Obligations: Action, Intention, and Valuation

by Thomas E. Wren

There are many ways of writing about the moral life; Moral Obligations follows the way of what philosophers call ""meta-ethics"": the analysis, not of particular moral problems, but of how the concepts used in formulating and solving them, concepts like ""right"" and ""obligatory,"" have significance and power over us. The meta-ethical part of this book is preceded by a discussion of action, in which Wren lays the foundations for the argument that moral obligation is a part of the formal structure of human agency.Wren's argument is practical and social-psychological: it is to help all, starting with those who are already committed to some version of the ethic of individual dignity, to promote interagency fellowship and peace as a result of seeing a certain truth, namely, the truth that the urgency of their feelings of moral obligation derives from a unspoken intention to belong to a community of agents.Moral Obligations begins with the philosophy of action, and then it reviews the historical debate about the nature of obligation and its social context. This is followed by a section about action in general: it establishes the standpoint of the agent and makes an inventory of several species of action. Later chapters summarize the foregoing themes, with emphasis on the unspoken side of intention, and develop them in conjunction with an analysis of the hypothetical imperative. The work closes with a discussion of the dilemma of membership in competing moral communities.

Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile, 1973-90 (St Antony's Series)

by P. Lowden

The book examines the political importance of moral opposition to authoritarian rule in Chile, 1973-90, as a challenge to the government's systematic human rights' violations. It was initially led by the Catholic Church, whose primate founded an organisation to defend human rights: the Vicariate of Solidarity (1976-92). The book assesses the impact of moral opposition as a force for redemocratisation by tracing the history and achievements of the Vicariate. It also argues that such moral matters are often underestimated in regime transition analysis.

Moral Order/World Order: The Role of Normative Theory in the Study of International Relations

by H. Dyer

Moral Order/World Order argues for the centrality of normative theory in the study of international relations. Two themes develop, each reflecting opposing pairs: fact/value, is/ought, description/prescription, feasibility/desirability. The first theme concerns the epistemological framework provided by a normative account. The second theme concerns the political conditions of knowledge which determine the role of different theories, indicating the need for adaptation of traditional normative scholarship, overcoming the separation of ethics from politics which has so far limited its role.

Moral Partiality (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy)

by Yong Li

Situated within the framework of Confucian family-oriented ethics, this book explores the issue of familial partiality and specifically discusses whether it is morally praiseworthy to love one’s family partially. In reviewing the tension between familial partiality and egalitarian impartiality from different perspectives while also drawing on binary metrics to understand the issue – that is the weak and strong sense of familial partiality in Confucian moral theory – the author carefully discusses the efficacy of three major arguments to justify moral partiality. It is concluded that the tree argument fails to justify moral partiality in Confucianism, the evolutionary argument only justifies moral partiality in the weak sense that we should devote more resources to our family, and the care argument fails to justify moral partiality in the strong sense that family takes priority in any case even at the expense of the principle of justice. Seeking to address the quandary, the author advances an alternative argument based on Thomas Aquinas’ theory of love to interpret Confucian view of partial relationships, holding that partial treatment is assumed in partial relationships.The title will appeal to scholars and students interested in Confucianism, Chinese Philosophy, Moral Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy.

Moral Partiality (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy)

by Yong Li

Situated within the framework of Confucian family-oriented ethics, this book explores the issue of familial partiality and specifically discusses whether it is morally praiseworthy to love one’s family partially. In reviewing the tension between familial partiality and egalitarian impartiality from different perspectives while also drawing on binary metrics to understand the issue – that is the weak and strong sense of familial partiality in Confucian moral theory – the author carefully discusses the efficacy of three major arguments to justify moral partiality. It is concluded that the tree argument fails to justify moral partiality in Confucianism, the evolutionary argument only justifies moral partiality in the weak sense that we should devote more resources to our family, and the care argument fails to justify moral partiality in the strong sense that family takes priority in any case even at the expense of the principle of justice. Seeking to address the quandary, the author advances an alternative argument based on Thomas Aquinas’ theory of love to interpret Confucian view of partial relationships, holding that partial treatment is assumed in partial relationships.The title will appeal to scholars and students interested in Confucianism, Chinese Philosophy, Moral Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy.

Moral Perception

by Robert Audi

We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.

Moral Perception

by Robert Audi

We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.

Moral Phenomena

by Nicolai Hartmann

Since the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism. Only a few philosophers have been able to escape from this Procrustean bed. Foremost among these few is Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Together with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, Hartmann was instrumental in restoring metaphysics. Hartmann's metaphysics differs markedly from that of both Bergson and Heidegger, in his indebtedness to Plato.In 1926, Hartmann published a massive treatise, Ethik, which was translated into English by Stanton Coit and published as Ethics in 1932. Ethics is probably the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The central concept of the book is ""value."" Drawing upon the pre-modern view of ethics, Hartmann maintains that values are objectively given, part and parcel of the order of being. We cannot invent values, we can merely discover them.The first part of Ethics is concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena and criticizes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. After some introductory thoughts concerning the competence of practical philosophy, Hartmann discusses the essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of the ""ought."" Hartmann is both controversial and compelling. He provides a moral philosophy that rejects the subjectivism of the ruling approaches, without taking recourse to older theological notions on the foundation of the ethical. In sum: Hartmann's Ethics constitutes an impressive and preeminent contribution to moral philosophy.

Moral Phenomena

by Nicolai Hartmann

Since the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism. Only a few philosophers have been able to escape from this Procrustean bed. Foremost among these few is Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Together with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, Hartmann was instrumental in restoring metaphysics. Hartmann's metaphysics differs markedly from that of both Bergson and Heidegger, in his indebtedness to Plato.In 1926, Hartmann published a massive treatise, Ethik, which was translated into English by Stanton Coit and published as Ethics in 1932. Ethics is probably the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The central concept of the book is ""value."" Drawing upon the pre-modern view of ethics, Hartmann maintains that values are objectively given, part and parcel of the order of being. We cannot invent values, we can merely discover them.The first part of Ethics is concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena and criticizes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. After some introductory thoughts concerning the competence of practical philosophy, Hartmann discusses the essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of the ""ought."" Hartmann is both controversial and compelling. He provides a moral philosophy that rejects the subjectivism of the ruling approaches, without taking recourse to older theological notions on the foundation of the ethical. In sum: Hartmann's Ethics constitutes an impressive and preeminent contribution to moral philosophy.

Moral Philosophers and the Novel: A Study of Winch, Nussbaum and Rorty

by P. Johnson

In this fascinating study, Peter Johnson makes explicit the issues involved in using the novel as a source in moral philosophy. The book pays close attention to questions of method, aesthetic accounts of the novel and the nature of ethical knowledge. The views of leading philosophers are examined and criticised in the light of the book's distinctive contribution to the current debate.

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life

by Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life addresses the questions of the role of moral philosophy and its relationship to our ordinary moral lives. Christensen's argument is motivated by the belief that one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today is the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops. The first part untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenge the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theories as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life; both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, her commitments, and her moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community, and her language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. While the scope of the argument is wide, the aims are more moderate: to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy aimed at spurring debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life

by Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life addresses the questions of the role of moral philosophy and its relationship to our ordinary moral lives. Christensen's argument is motivated by the belief that one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today is the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops. The first part untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenge the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theories as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life; both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, her commitments, and her moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community, and her language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. While the scope of the argument is wide, the aims are more moderate: to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy aimed at spurring debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.

The Moral Philosophy of David Hume

by R.David Broiles

This work is primarily concerned with Hume's arguments concerning the respective roles of reason and passion in moral decisions. Thus, the major part of the work deals with section I of Part I of Book III of the Treatise, where Hume argues that moral distinctions are not derived from reason. But in discussing this section, I have had to take into account most ofthe other sections of Book III, and some important ones from Book II of the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Omissions, however, are noticeable. While I have gone into great detail on Parts I and II ofthe Treatise of Morals, I have omitted any discussion of Part III. I have not discussed everything Hume has to say on ethics, or even everything in Book III of the Treatise. I have placed certain limits on myself in writing this work. I attempt to point out only what is central to Hume's ethics, and this I believe to be the first section of Book III, and to show how certain assumptions and conclusions of this section underlie the rest of Hume's considerations on ethics. Thus, I have tried to show that Hume's discussion of the artificial virtues necessarily follows from the assump­ tions and conclusions of section I. But I leave it to the reader, in his further study of Hume, to apply my points to other sections of Hume that I have not discussed.

The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley (International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées #33)

by Paul J. Olscamp

Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to our selves. That we have 1 first raised a dust, and then complain, we cannot see. . . . there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will 2 appear not to follow from them. In an effort to comply with these excellent principles of Berkeley's, I have tried to avoid complex language throughout this book, and to give all of his works the careful scrutiny he urges in order to avoid misplaced emphasis and quoting out of context. George Berkeley waS born in Dysert Castle, Thomastown, Kilkenny, Ireland, in 1685. He is among the best known of Western philosophers, but a brief sketch of the high points of his life might nonetheless be of some interest. His father William Berkeley was related to Lord Berkeley of Stratton, who was the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from 1670 to 1672. His mother was probably related to General Wolfe, the conqueror of Montcalm in Canada. He was educated at Kilkenny School, and at Trinity College, Dublin, where he received Bachelor's and Master's degrees in 1704 and 1707 respectively.

The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori: Agency and Ethical Life

by Patrick Frierson

In the first scholarly exposition of Maria Montessori's moral philosophy, Patrick R. Frierson presents an empirically-grounded ethics that takes its start from our tendency to strive for excellence and emphasizes mutual respect, social solidarity, and love. Laying out a compelling, Montessorian approach to ethical life, Frierson constructs an account of human agency based on children, who when attentively at work on self-chosen tasks, have agency worthy of respect. Through this interpretation of children's agency, he introduces the core concept of Montessorian “character”: in Montessori's ethics, character provides the ultimate value worthy of direct respect, and those with character have a natural tendency to respect others. Character is enhanced through corporate forms of agency that Montessori calls “social solidarity.” Weaving this educationalist's ethics with theory from Nietzsche, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, Frierson places Montessori in the context of the history of philosophy. His study effectively unites philosophy and education, showing how human ethical life can be enhanced through a moral theory based on the respectful attention to the lived agency of young children.

The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori: Agency and Ethical Life

by Patrick Frierson

In the first scholarly exposition of Maria Montessori's moral philosophy, Patrick R. Frierson presents an empirically-grounded ethics that takes its start from our tendency to strive for excellence and emphasizes mutual respect, social solidarity, and love. Laying out a compelling, Montessorian approach to ethical life, Frierson constructs an account of human agency based on children, who when attentively at work on self-chosen tasks, have agency worthy of respect. Through this interpretation of children's agency, he introduces the core concept of Montessorian “character”: in Montessori's ethics, character provides the ultimate value worthy of direct respect, and those with character have a natural tendency to respect others. Character is enhanced through corporate forms of agency that Montessori calls “social solidarity.” Weaving this educationalist's ethics with theory from Nietzsche, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, Frierson places Montessori in the context of the history of philosophy. His study effectively unites philosophy and education, showing how human ethical life can be enhanced through a moral theory based on the respectful attention to the lived agency of young children.

Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity (The New Synthese Historical Library #57)

by Jill Kraye Risto Saarinen

Over the past twenty years the transition from the late Middle Ages to the early modern era has received increasing attention from experts in the history of philosophy. In part, this new interest arises from claims, made in literature aimed at a less specialist readership, that this transition was responsible for the subsequent philosophical and theological problems of the Enlightenment. Philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre and theologians like John Milbank display a certain nostalgia for the medieval synthesis of Thomas Aquinas and, consequently, evaluate the period from 1300 to 1700 in rather negative terms. Other historians of philosophy writing for the general public, such as Charles Taylor, take a more positive view of the Reformation but nevertheless conclude that modernity has been shaped by 1 conflicts which stem from early modern times. Ethics and moral thought occupy a central place in these theories. It is assumed that we have lost something – the concept of virtue, for instance, or the source of common morality. Yet those who put forward such notions do not treat the history of ethics in detail. From the historian’s perspective, their far-reaching theoretical assumptions are based on a quite small body of textual evidence. In reality, there was a rich variety of approaches to moral thinking and ethical theories during the period from 1400 to 1600.

Moral Philosophy (PDF)

by Dan Cardinal Gerald Jones Jeremy Hayward

An accessible, student-centred guide to the key ideas in moral philosophy. Suitable for both A Level and undergraduate study. This book provides an accessible, readable, student-centred guide to moral philosophy. Through lucid explanation, careful use of modern examples and engaging activities it leads students towards deeper understanding of all the key issues in the study of ethics.

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