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Scientific Knowledge: Causation, Explanation, and Corroboration (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science #69)

With this defense of intensional realism as a philosophical foundation for understanding scientific procedures and grounding scientific knowledge, James Fetzer provides a systematic alternative to much of recent work on scientific theory. To Fetzer, the current state of understanding the 'laws' of nature, or the 'law-like' statements of scientific theories, appears to be one of philosophical defeat; and he is determined to overcome that defeat. Based upon his incisive advocacy of the single-case propensity interpretation of probability, Fetzer develops a coherent structure within which the central problems of the philosophy of science find their solutions. Whether the reader accepts the author's contentions may, in the end, depend upon ancient choices in the interpretation of experience and explanation, but there can be little doubt of Fetzer's spirited competence in arguing for setting ontology before epistemology, and within the analysis of language. To us, Fetzer's ambition is appealing, fusing, as he says, the substantive commitment of the Popperian with the conscientious sensitivity of the Hempelian to the technical precision required for justified explication. To Fetzer, science is the objective pursuit of fallible general knowledge. This innocent character­ ization, which we suppose most scientists would welcome, receives a most careful elaboration in this book; it will demand equally careful critical con­ sideration. Center for the Philosophy and ROBERT S. COHEN History of Science, MARX W. WARTOFSKY Boston University October 1981 v TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE v FOREWORD xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv PART I: CAUSATION 1.

Scientific Knowledge and Philosophic Thought

Originally published in 1986. Are there two kinds of problems—the scientific and the philosophic—each requiring different methods for solution? Or are there, rather, two different ways of approaching a problem, each yielding a different answer according to the method used? Biomedical researcher Sir Harold Himsworth urges scientists not to shy away from using scientific methods to grapple with problems traditionally accepted as belonging to the province of philosophy. The difference between science and philosophy lies not in the problems to which they are directed, Himsworth argues, but rather in the methods they use for solving them. To the scientist, a proposition is something to be investigated; to the philosopher, something to be accepted as a basis for thought. Since the development of the scientific method, substantial progress has been made toward mastering problems in the natural environment. If we are ever to attain a degree of control over problems that derive from human activities, Himsworth claims that we only succeed by approaching them in a comparably objective way.

Scientific Knowledge and the Transgression of Boundaries (Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft / Futures of Technology, Science and Society)

The aim of this book is to understand and critically appraise science-based transgression dynamics in their whole complexity. It includes contributions from experts with different disciplinary backgrounds, such as philosophy, history and sociology. Thus, it is in itself an example of boundary transgression.Scientific disciplines and their objects have tended to be seen as permanent and distinct. However, science is better conceived as an activity that constantly surpasses, erases and rebuilds all kinds of boundaries, either disciplinary, socio-ethical or ecological. This transgressive capacity, a characteristic trait of science and its applications, defines us as “knowledge societies.” However, scientific and technological developments are also sources of serious environmental and social concerns.

Scientific Materialism (Episteme #9)

The word 'materialism' is ambiguous: it designates a moral doc­ trine as well as a philosophy and, indeed, an entire world view. Moral materialism is identical with hedonism, or the doctrine that humans should pursue only their own pleasure. Philosophical ma­ terialismis the view that the real worId is composed exclusively of material things. The two doctrines are logically independent: hedonism is consistent with immaterialism, and materialism is compatible with high minded morals. We shall be concerned ex­ c1usively with philosophical materialism. And we shall not confuse it with realism, or the epistemological doctrine that knowIedge, or at any rate scientific knowledge, attempts to represent reality. Philosophical materialism is not a recent fad and it is not a solid block: it is as old as philosophy and it has gone through six quite different stages. The first was ancient materialism, centered around Greek and Indian atomism. The second was the revival of the first during the 17th century. The third was 18th century ma­ terialism, partly derived from one side of Descartes' ambiguous legacy. The fourth was the mid-19th century "scientific" material­ ism, which flourished mainly in Germany and England, and was tied to the upsurge of chemistry and biology. The fifth was dialec­ tical and historical materialism, which accompanied the consolida­ tion of the socialist ideology. And the sixth or current stage, evolved mainly by Australian and American philosophers, is aca­ demic and nonpartisan but otherwise very heterogeneous. Ancient materialism was thoroughly mechanistic.

Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany (Studies in the History of Modern Science #1)

A comprehensive study of German materialism in the second half of the nineteenth century is long overdue. Among contemporary historians the mere passing references to Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, and Ludwig Buchner as materialists and popularizers of science are hardly sufficient, for few individuals influenced public opinion in nineteenth-century Germany more than these men. Buchner, for example, revealed his awareness of the historical significance of his Kraft und Stoff in comments made in 1872, just seventeen years after its original appearance. A philosophical book which has undergone twelve big German editions in the short span of seventeen years, which further has been issued in non-German countries and languages about fifteen to sixteen times in the same period, and whose appearance (although its author was entirely unknown up to then) has called forth an almost unprecedented storm in the press, . . . such a book can be nothing ordinary; the world-calling it enjoys at present must be justified through its wholly special characteristics or by the merits of its form and content. ' Vogt, Moleschott and Buchner explicitly held that their materialism was founded on natural science. But other materialists of the nineteenth century also laid claim to the scientific character of their own thought. It is likely that Marx and Engels would have permitted their brand of materialism to have been called scientific, provided, of course, that 'scientific' was understood in their dialectical meaning of the term. Socialism, Engels maintained, had become a science with Marx.

Scientific Method: The Hypothetico-Experimental Laboratory Procedure of the Physical Sciences

There remains only the obligation to thank those who have helped me with specific suggestions and the editors who have kindly granted permission to reprint material which first appeared in the pages of their journals. To the former group belong Alan B. Brinkley and Max O. Hocutt Portion of chap­ ters I and VI were published in Philosophy of Science; of chapters IV and V in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine; of chapter VIII in Dialectica; of chapter IX in The British lournal for the Philosophy of Science; and of chapter XIII in Synthese. J.K.F. New Orleans, 1971 PREFACE In this book I have tried to describe the scientific method, understood as the hypothetico-experimental technique of investigation which has been prac­ ticed so successfully in the physical sciences. It is the first volume of a three-volume work on the philosophy of science, each of which, however, is complete and independent. A second volume will contain an account of the domain in which the method operates and a history of empiricism. A third volume will be devoted to the philosophy of science proper: the metaphysics and epistemology presupposed by the method, its logical structure, and the ethical implications of its results.

Scientific Method: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction

The central theme running throughout this outstanding new survey is the nature of the philosophical debate created by modern science's foundation in experimental and mathematical method. More recently, recognition that reasoning in science is probabilistic generated intense debate about whether and how it should be constrained so as to ensure the practical certainty of the conclusions drawn. These debates brought to light issues of a philosophical nature which form the core of many scientific controversies today. Scientific Method: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction presents these debates through clear and comparative discussion of key figures in the history of science. Key chapters critically discuss* Galileo's demonstrative method, Bacon's inductive method, and Newton's rules of reasoning* the rise of probabilistic `Bayesian' methods in the eighteenth century* the method of hypotheses through the work of Herschel, Mill and Whewell* the conventionalist views of Poincaré and Duhem* the inductivism of Peirce, Russell and Keynes* Popper's falsification compared with Reichenbach's enumerative induction* Carnap's scientific method as Bayesian reasoningThe debates are brought up to date in the final chapters by considering the ways in which ideas about method in the physical and biological sciences have affected thinking about method in the social sciences. This debate is analyzed through the ideas of key theorists such as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend.

Scientific Method: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction

The central theme running throughout this outstanding new survey is the nature of the philosophical debate created by modern science's foundation in experimental and mathematical method. More recently, recognition that reasoning in science is probabilistic generated intense debate about whether and how it should be constrained so as to ensure the practical certainty of the conclusions drawn. These debates brought to light issues of a philosophical nature which form the core of many scientific controversies today. Scientific Method: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction presents these debates through clear and comparative discussion of key figures in the history of science. Key chapters critically discuss* Galileo's demonstrative method, Bacon's inductive method, and Newton's rules of reasoning* the rise of probabilistic `Bayesian' methods in the eighteenth century* the method of hypotheses through the work of Herschel, Mill and Whewell* the conventionalist views of Poincaré and Duhem* the inductivism of Peirce, Russell and Keynes* Popper's falsification compared with Reichenbach's enumerative induction* Carnap's scientific method as Bayesian reasoningThe debates are brought up to date in the final chapters by considering the ways in which ideas about method in the physical and biological sciences have affected thinking about method in the social sciences. This debate is analyzed through the ideas of key theorists such as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend.

Scientific Models: Red Atoms, White Lies and Black Boxes in a Yellow Book

A zebrafish, the hull of a miniature ship, a mathematical equation and a food chain - what do these things have in common? They are examples of models used by scientists to isolate and study particular aspects of the world around us. This book begins by introducing the concept of a scientific model from an intuitive perspective, drawing parallels to mental models and artistic representations. It then recounts the history of modelling from the 16th century up until the present day. The iterative process of model building is described and discussed in the context of complex models with high predictive accuracy versus simpler models that provide more of a conceptual understanding. To illustrate the diversity of opinions within the scientific community, we also present the results of an interview study, in which ten scientists from different disciplines describe their views on modelling and how models feature in their work. Lastly, it includes a number of worked examples that span different modelling approaches and techniques. It provides a comprehensive introduction to scientific models and shows how models are constructed and used in modern science. It also addresses the approach to, and the culture surrounding modelling in different scientific disciplines. It serves as an inspiration for model building and also facilitates interdisciplinary collaborations by showing how models are used in different scientific fields. The book is aimed primarily at students in the sciences and engineering, as well as students at teacher training colleges but will also appeal to interested readers wanting to get an overview of scientific modelling in general and different modelling approaches in particular.

Scientific Models and Decision Making (Elements in the Philosophy of Science)

This Element introduces the philosophical literature on models, with an emphasis on normative considerations relevant to models for decision-making. Chapter 1 gives an overview of core questions in the philosophy of modeling. Chapter 2 examines the concept of model adequacy for purpose, using three examples of models from the atmospheric sciences to describe how this sort of adequacy is determined in practice. Chapter 3 explores the significance of using models that are not adequate for purpose, including the purpose of informing public decisions. Chapter 4 provides a basic framework for values in modelling, using a case study to highlight the ethical challenges in building models for decision making. It concludes by establishing the need for strategies to manage value judgments in modelling, including the potential for public participation in the process.

Scientific Objectivity and Its Contexts

The first part of this book is of an epistemological nature and develops an original theory of scientific objectivity, understood in a weak sense (as intersubjective agreement among the specialists) and a strong sense (as having precise concrete referents). In both cases it relies upon the adoption of operational criteria designed within the particular perspective under which any single science considers reality. The “object” so attained has a proper ontological status, dependent on the specific character of the criteria of reference (regional ontologies). This justifies a form of scientific realism. Such perspectives are also the result of a complex cultural-historical situation. The awareness of such a “historical determinacy” of science justifies including in the philosophy of science the problems of ethics of science, relations of science with metaphysics and social dimensions of science that overstep the traditional restriction of the philosophy of science to an epistemology of science. It is to this “context” that the second part of the book is devoted.

Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science)

Both science and philosophy are interested in questions of ontology - questions about what exists and what these things are like. Science and philosophy, however, seem like very different ways of investigating the world, so how should one proceed? Some defer to the sciences, conceived as something apart from philosophy, and others to metaphysics, conceived as something apart from science, for certain kinds of answers. This book contends that these sorts of deference are misconceived. A compelling account of ontology must appreciate the ways in which the sciences incorporate metaphysical assumptions and arguments. At the same time, it must pay careful attention to how observation, experience, and the empirical dimensions of science are related to what may be viewed as defensible philosophical theorizing about ontology. The promise of an effectively naturalized metaphysics is to encourage beliefs that are formed in ways that do justice to scientific theorizing, modeling, and experimentation. But even armed with such a view, there is no one, uniquely rational way to draw lines between domains of ontology that are suitable for belief, and ones in which it would be better to suspend belief instead. In crucial respects, ontology is in the eye of the beholder: it is informed by underlying commitments with implications for the limits of inquiry, which inevitably vary across rational inquirers. As result, the proper scope of ontology is subject to a striking form of voluntary choice, yielding a new and transformative conception of scientific ontology.

Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science)

Both science and philosophy are interested in questions of ontology - questions about what exists and what these things are like. Science and philosophy, however, seem like very different ways of investigating the world, so how should one proceed? Some defer to the sciences, conceived as something apart from philosophy, and others to metaphysics, conceived as something apart from science, for certain kinds of answers. This book contends that these sorts of deference are misconceived. A compelling account of ontology must appreciate the ways in which the sciences incorporate metaphysical assumptions and arguments. At the same time, it must pay careful attention to how observation, experience, and the empirical dimensions of science are related to what may be viewed as defensible philosophical theorizing about ontology. The promise of an effectively naturalized metaphysics is to encourage beliefs that are formed in ways that do justice to scientific theorizing, modeling, and experimentation. But even armed with such a view, there is no one, uniquely rational way to draw lines between domains of ontology that are suitable for belief, and ones in which it would be better to suspend belief instead. In crucial respects, ontology is in the eye of the beholder: it is informed by underlying commitments with implications for the limits of inquiry, which inevitably vary across rational inquirers. As result, the proper scope of ontology is subject to a striking form of voluntary choice, yielding a new and transformative conception of scientific ontology.

Scientific Opportunism L’Opportunisme scientifique: An Anthology (Publications des Archives Henri Poincaré Publications of the Henri Poincaré Archives)

The Scientific Outlook

According to Bertrand Russell, science is knowledge; that which seeks general laws connecting a number of particular facts. It is, he argues, far superior to art, where much of the knowledge is intangible and assumed. In The Scientific Outlook, Russell delivers one of his most important works, exploring the nature and scope of scientific knowledge, the increased power over nature that science affords and the changes in the lives of human beings that result from new forms of science. Insightful and accessible, this impressive work sees Russell at his very best.

The Scientific Outlook

According to Bertrand Russell, science is knowledge; that which seeks general laws connecting a number of particular facts. It is, he argues, far superior to art, where much of the knowledge is intangible and assumed. In The Scientific Outlook, Russell delivers one of his most important works, exploring the nature and scope of scientific knowledge, the increased power over nature that science affords and the changes in the lives of human beings that result from new forms of science. Insightful and accessible, this impressive work sees Russell at his very best.

The Scientific Outlook

'A scientific opinion is one which there is some reason to believe is true; an unscientific opinion is one which is held for some reason other than its probable truth.' - Bertrand RussellOne of Russell's most important books, this early classic on science illuminates his thinking on the promise and threat of scientific progress. Russell considers three questions fundamental to an understanding of science: the nature and scope of scientific knowledge, the increased power over nature that science affords, and the changes in the lives of human beings that result from new forms of science. With customary wit and clarity, Russell offers brilliant discussions of many major scientific figures, including Aristotle, Galileo, Newton and Darwin.With a new introduciton by David Papineau, King's College, London.

The Scientific Outlook (Routledge Classics Ser.)

'A scientific opinion is one which there is some reason to believe is true; an unscientific opinion is one which is held for some reason other than its probable truth.' - Bertrand RussellOne of Russell's most important books, this early classic on science illuminates his thinking on the promise and threat of scientific progress. Russell considers three questions fundamental to an understanding of science: the nature and scope of scientific knowledge, the increased power over nature that science affords, and the changes in the lives of human beings that result from new forms of science. With customary wit and clarity, Russell offers brilliant discussions of many major scientific figures, including Aristotle, Galileo, Newton and Darwin.With a new introduciton by David Papineau, King's College, London.

Scientific Pascal

Guide to this Book My main objective is to teach programming in Pascal to people in the hard sciences and technology, who don't have much patience with the standard textbooks with their lengthy, pedantic approach, and their many examples of no interest to scientists and engineers. Another objective is to present many both interesting and useful algorithms and programs. A secondary objective is to explain how to cope with various features of the PC hardware. Pascal really is a wonderful programming language. It is easy to learn and to remember, and it has unrivalled clarity. You get serious results in short order. How should you read this book? Maybe backwards is the answer. If you are just starting with the Borland Pascal package, you must begin with Appendix 1, The Borland Pascal Package. If you are a Pascal user already, still you should skim over Appendix 1. Appendix 2, On Programming, has material on saving programming time and on debugging that might be useful for reference. Chapter 1, Introduction to Pascal, will hardly be read by the experienced Pascal programmer (unless he or she has not used units). Chapter 2, Programming Basics, begins to sample deeper waters, and I hope everyone will find something interesting there. Chapter 3, Files, Records, Pointers, is the final chapter to concentrate on the Pascal programming language; the remaining chapters concentrate on various areas of application.

Scientific Perspectivism

Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn theorized forty years ago. Using the example of color vision in humans to illustrate how his theory of “perspectivism” works, Ronald N. Giere argues that colors do not actually exist in objects; rather, color is the result of an interaction between aspects of the world and the human visual system. Giere extends this argument into a general interpretation of human perception and, more controversially, to scientific observation, conjecturing that the output of scientific instruments is perspectival. Furthermore, complex scientific principles—such as Maxwell’s equations describing the behavior of both the electric and magnetic fields—make no claims about the world, but models based on those principles can be used to make claims about specific aspects of the world. Offering a solution to the most contentious debate in the philosophy of science over the past thirty years, Scientific Perspectivism will be of interest to anyone involved in the study of science.

Scientific Philosophy

This textbook presents the basics of philosophy that are necessary for the student and researcher in science in order to better understand scientific work. The approach is not historical but formative: tools for semantical analysis, ontology of science, epistemology, and scientific ethics are presented in a formal and direct way. The book has two parts: one with the general theory and a second part with application to some problems such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of mathematics, and the ontology of spacetime. The book addresses questions such as "What is meaning?", "What is truth?", "What are truth criteria in science?", "What is a theory?", "What is a model?" "What is a datum?", "What is information?", "What does it mean to understand something?", "What is space?", "What is time?", "How are these concepts articulated in science?" "What are values?" "What are the limits of science?", and many more. The philosophical views presented are "scientific" in the sense that they are informed by current science, they are relevant for scientific research, and the method adopted uses the hypothetical-deductive approach that is characteristic of science. The results and conclusions, as any scientific conclusion, are open to revision in the light of future advances. Hence, this philosophical approach opposes to dogmatic philosophy. Supported by end-of-chapter summaries and a list of special symbols used, the material will be of interest for students and researchers in both science and philosophy. The second part will appeal to physicists and mathematicians.

Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook #1)

Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development is the first Yearbook of the Vienna Circle Institute, which was founded in October 1991. The book contains original contributions to an international symposium which was the first public event to be organised by the Institute: `Vienna--Berlin--Prague: The Rise of Scientific Philosophy: The Centenaries of Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach and Edgar Zilsel.' The first section of the book - `Scientific Philosophy - Origins and Developments' reveals the extent of scientific communication in the inter-War years between these great metropolitan centres, as well as presenting systematic investigations into the relevance of the heritage of the Vienna Circle to contemporary research and philosophy. This section offers a new paradigm for scientific philosophy, one which contrasts with the historiographical received view of logical empiricism. Support for this re-evaluation is offered in the second section, which contains, for the first time in English translation, Gustav Bergmann's recollections of the Vienna Circle, and an historical study of political economist Wilhelm Neurath, Otto Neurath's father. The third section gives a report on current computer-based research which documents the relevance of Otto Neurath's `Vienna method of pictorial statistics', or `Isotypes'. A review section describes new publications on Neurath and the Vienna Circle, as well anthologies relevant to Viennese philosophy and its history, setting them in their wider cultural and political perspective. Finally, a description is given of the Vienna Circle Institute and its activities since its foundation, as well as of its plans for the future.

Scientific Philosophy Today: Essays in Honor of Mario Bunge (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science #67)

This volume is dedicated to Mario Bunge in honor of his sixtieth birthday. Mario Bunge is a philosopher of great repute, whose enormous output includes dozens of books in several languages, which will culminate with his Treatise on Basic Philosophy projected in seven volumes, four of which have already appeared [Reidel, I 974ff. ]. He is known for his works on research methods, the foundations of physics, biology, the social sciences, the diverse applications of mathematical methods and of systems analysis, and more. Bunge stands for exact philosophy, classical liberal social philosophy, rationalism and enlightenment. He is brave, even relentless, in his attacks on subjectivism, mentalism, and spiritualism, as well as on positivism, mechanism, and dialectics. He believes in logic and clarity, in science and open-mindedness - not as the philosopher's equivalent to the poli­ tician's rhetoric of motherhood and apple pie, but as a matter of everyday practice, as qualities to cultivate daily in our pursuit of the life worth living. Bunge's philosophy often has the quality of Columbus's egg, and he is prone to come to swift and decisive conclusions on the basis of argu­ ments which seem to him valid; he will not be perturbed by the fact that most of the advanced thinkers in the field hold different views.

Scientific Procedures: A Contribution Concerning the Methodological Problems of Scientific Concepts and Scientific Explanation (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science #10)

For a decade, we have admired the incisive and broadly informed works of Ladislav Tondl on the foundations of science. Now it is indeed a pleasure to include this book among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We hope that it will help to deepen the collaborative scholar­ ship of scientists and philosophers in Czechoslovakia with the English­ reading scholars of the world. Professor Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924, and completed his higher education at the Charles University iIi Prague. His doctorate was granted by the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. He was a professor and scientific research worker at the Institute for the Theory and Methodology of Science, which was a component part of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Tondl's principal fields of interest are the methodology of the empirical and experimental sciences, logical semantics, and cybernetics. For many years, he collaborated with Professor Albert Perez and others at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation in Prague, and he has undertaken fruitful collaboration with logicians in the Soviet and Polish schools, and been influenced by the Finnish logicians as well, among them Jaakko Hintikka. We list below a selection of his main publications. Perhaps the most accessible in presenting his central conception of the relationship between modem information theory and the methodology of the sciences is his 1965 paper with Perez, 'On the Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures'.

The Scientific Process

Some preliminary observations must be made concerning the nature and purpose of this study. What I have attempted here is an essay in the metaphysics of science, and not the "philosophy of science. " Rather than concentrating on the details of theory-construction and the for­ mal structure of scientific systems, I have treated science as an enter­ prise, a developing process within human experience. I have used such an approach in order to analyze science in its relationship to other human enterprises, such as art and philosophy, and to clarify its unique goals and characteristics. Often the concepts employed in descriptions of scientific methods are conceived too narrowly; by broadening the focus of attention I have attempted to characterize in a fairly general fashion the goals and methods of science. This has led to formulations which may seem at first glance to depart radically from some "well­ established" distinctions of the philosophy of science. I hope that it will be clear, however, that such formulations arise at a different level of analysis and concern very different problems from those of the logic of science. In particular, I am concerned with the general goals of science. These must not be confused with the narrower principles of method employed in science at any given time.