The Theory of Extensive Form Games

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Synopsis

This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.

Book details

Edition:
1st ed. 2016
Series:
Springer Series in Game Theory
Author:
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger
ISBN:
9783662499443
Related ISBNs:
9783662499429
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages:
N/A
Reading age:
Not specified
Includes images:
Yes
Date of addition:
2019-10-15
Usage restrictions:
Copyright
Copyright date:
2016
Copyright by:
N/A 
Adult content:
No
Language:
English
Categories:
Business and Finance, Mathematics and Statistics, Nonfiction