Thick Concepts

You must be logged in to access this title.

Sign up now

Already a member? Log in

Synopsis

What is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts (such as good, bad, right and wrong) are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones (including brave, rude, gracious, wicked, sympathetic, and mean) are termed thick concepts. In this
volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. How do the descriptive and evaluative functions or elements of thick concepts combine with each other? Are these functions or elements separable in the first place? Is there a sharp division between
thin and thick concepts? Can we mark interesting further distinctions between how thick ethical concepts work and how other thick concepts work, such as those found in aesthetics and epistemology? How, if at all, are thick concepts related to reasons and action? These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise
fascinating issues about how language works.

Book details

Series:
Mind Association Occasional Series
Author:
Simon Kirchin
ISBN:
9780191652509
Related ISBNs:
9780199672349
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Pages:
N/A
Reading age:
Not specified
Includes images:
No
Date of addition:
2022-10-06
Usage restrictions:
Copyright
Copyright date:
2013
Copyright by:
N/A 
Adult content:
No
Language:
English
Categories:
Nonfiction, Philosophy